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Abstract
Code injection vulnerabilities continue to prevail. At-
tacks of this kind such as stack buffer overflows and heap
buffer overflows account for roughly half of the vulnerabil-
ities discovered in software every year. The research pre-
sented in this paper extends earlier work in the area of
code injection attack detection in UNIX environments. It
presents a framework for detecting new or previously un-
seen code injection attacks in a heterogeneous networking
environment and compares code injection attack and de-
tection strategies used in the UNIX and Windows environ-
ments. The approach presented is capable of detecting both
obfuscated and clear text attacks, and is suitable for imple-
mentation in the Windows environment. A prototype intru-
sion detection system (IDS) capable of detecting code injec-
tion attacks, both clear text attacks and obfuscated attacks,
which targets Windows systems is presented.
1. Introduction
Code injection vulnerabilities continue to prevail despite
increasing efforts to secure applications, by methods such
as secure programming practices and patch distribution. It
has been estimated that roughly half of the vulnerabilities
discovered in software every year are code injection vul-
nerabilities. Code injection attacks operate by injecting
executable code of the attacker’s choice into a vulnerable
process. The executable code consists of machine instruc-
tions for the targeted architecture. This code is referred to
throughout this paper as shellcode, as historically the in-
jected code was constructed to spawn a shell on the target
system. The consequence of this type of attack is that the at-
tacker can potentially run arbitrary code with the privileges
of the vulnerable process.
A code injection attack injects some executable code
through an injection vector manifesting itself as a vulnera-
bility in the targeted process. Examples of attack strategies
that utilise different injection vectors are the stack buffer
overflow, heap buffer overflow and format string bugs. The
aim of this process is to inject the attacker’s executable code
and gain control of the instruction pointer of the targeted
process so that it points to, and thus transfers execution to
the attacker’s injected code.
In this paper we present a new network-based intrusion
detection system (NIDS) approach for detecting new or pre-
viously unseen code injection attacks. The research pre-
sented in this paper extends earlier work [2] in the area of
obfuscated code injection attack detection for the UNIX en-
vironment by presenting a framework for detecting both ob-
fuscated and clear text code injection attacks in a heteroge-
neous environment. The requirements for detecting attacks
targeting the Windows platform are described by compar-
ing with the previous UNIX detection work. (We are col-
lectively referring to Windows 2000, XP and 2003 as the
Windows platform).
Section 2 discusses existing approaches for detecting
code injection attacks. Sections 3 and 4 examine code
injection attack strategies, and approaches for monitoring
executable code in the Windows environment. Section 5
presents our framework for detecting the relevant attacks in
a heterogeneous environment. Sections 6 and 7 presents
our implementation of the Windows monitoring environ-
ment and test results for detecting attacks targeting Win-
dows respectively. Finally conclusions and future work are
presented in Section 8.
2. Related Work
This section examines a taxonomy of intrusion detection
systems and existing approaches to detecting code injection
attacks. The examined systems are discussed with regards
to desirable properties identified in the taxonomy.
The goal of an intrusion detection system is to detect at-
tacks against computer systems and networks. This func-
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tionality is needed because of the difficulty in creating com-
puter systems that are provably secure for all intended uses.
Debar et al. have created a taxonomy of intrusion detec-
tion systems [6], by which they identify several measures
of IDS efficiency. Primary measures are accuracy and com-
pleteness. These terms will be used throughout the paper as
defined by Debar et al.
Accuracy provides an indication of the IDS’s ability to
identify malicious activity. An erroneous alert generated
by an IDS is referred to as a false positive. Completeness
refers to the proportion of all attacks an IDS is capable of
detecting. The failure of an IDS to generate an alert in the
presence of malicious activity is referred to as a false nega-
tive. The rest of this section reviews existing approaches to
detect code injection attacks with focus on the accuracy and
completeness properties of each approach.
Signature based IDSes operate by comparing network
traffic to a database of signatures describing known attacks.
If a signature matches the pattern of a sequence of bytes
in the packet the packet is considered to represent mali-
cious activity and an alert is generated. Signature based
IDSes can have good accuracy characteristics and generate
very few false positives provided that the signatures used are
well formulated. However, in practise, attaining complete-
ness is hampered by the following issues. Resent research
in the area of IDS avoidance [9] has shown that producing
exploits that avoid detection is trivial provided the signature
describes the exploit rather than the vulnerability. The com-
pleteness property of a signature based system is also lim-
ited to known attacks since the systemmust have a signature
for all malicious activity to provide complete coverage. De-
spite obvious shortcomings, signature based systems are the
most commonly deployed intrusion detection systems and
popular open source detectors such as Snort [5] are freely
available.
The NOP detection approach programmatically identi-
fies in network traffic a sequence of executable instructions
which, when executed by a processor, have the effect of in-
creasing the instruction pointer while producing negligible
side effects on the state of the program. Examples of in-
structions searched for in this approach are the NOP, POP,
INC, DEC and JMP instructions. The NOP detection ap-
proach provides an excellent completeness property for the
UNIX environment since most UNIX code injection attacks
rely on the presence of a NOP sledge. This is due to the dif-
ficulty in determining the location at which the exploit code
will be injected in memory of target UNIX hosts (this is
discussed in more detail in Section 3).
This detection approach does not however perform as
well in the Windows environment as the NOP sledge tech-
nique is not typically needed. This is due to the more de-
terministic nature of memory layout on this platform. Win-
dows is distributed as binary files, which in turn are pro-
duced by a smaller number of variants of compiler or pro-
gramming environment, leading to predictable and repro-
ducible determination of the location of instructions needed
to seize control of the instruction pointer. Furthermore
the accuracy of the NOP detection approach is poor be-
cause signatures matching NOP instructions also match
amounts of normal traffic and therefore this approach gen-
erates scores of false positives.
The abstract payload execution detection approach [12]
operates by searching for consecutive correct and valid ma-
chine instructions in network traffic. Correctness refers to
bytes identified in the network stream that represent valid
machine instructions and validity refers to valid memory
references for instructions that operate on memory. This ap-
proach has been implemented with good completeness and
accuracy properties for DNS and HTTP requests. We spec-
ulate that this approach is better suited for text based proto-
cols utilising lower case ASCII characters than it would be
for protocols that transmit binary data or protocols transmit-
ting a large number of consecutive upper case ASCII char-
acters since their hex value all represent valid single byte
machine instructions.
Specification based systems provide excellent accuracy
and completeness properties because they explicitly model
all of the aspects of the protocols and application IO used
on the network they protect. A specification based system
may know that the input buffer an application or a field in
a protocol should be 256 bytes long and therefore reject all
data that exceeds the length of this input buffer. Overflow-
ing a buffer in an application is therefore impossible with-
out being detected and the system would never detect an
attack without the presence of malicious traffic. This ap-
proach does however require that all protected applications
and protocols be analysed with regard to the size of their in-
put buffers and structure of protocols. This exercise may be
impractical especially for applications whose source is not
freely available.
The system call detection approach [1] operates by
analysing network traffic searching for evidence of system
call usage in the packet payloads. Code injection attacks
that exploit UNIX hosts usually carry payloads with fre-
quent use of system calls. This approach provides good
completeness and accuracy properties for UNIX attacks that
carry the payload in clear text. The approach is however
vulnerable to attacks that carry obfuscated payloads. It is
also not suited to Windows attack detection, as the major-
ity of exploits operate by calling functions in Dynamic Link
Libraries (DLLs) instead of interacting directly with the op-
erating system (as discussed in Section 3).
The following section gives a background to code injec-
tion attack strategies. It examines how control is gained
over the instruction pointer for Windows and UNIX envi-
ronments and how the payload of the attack must be crafted
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differently depending on the platform that is targeted for the
attack.
3. Code Injection Attack Strategies
This section examines code injection attacks, the steps
required to gain control of the instruction pointer by mod-
ifying the instruction pointer register (EIP) and the con-
struction of the payload used in the attack. The approach
favoured in the Windows environment is compared to that
favoured in the UNIX environment.
3.1. Seizing Control of the Instruction Pointer
Code injection attacks represent a group of attacks that
attempt to break the execution path of a process by seizing
control of the instruction pointer so that the attacker’s in-
jected code is executed. This is achieved by inserting some
executable code through an injection vector. The stack over-
flow, heap overflow and format string bugs all represent in-
jection vectors for code injection attacks. By employing an
attack of this type the attacker may potentially execute arbi-
trary code with the privileges of the vulnerable process. The
injected code may consist of machine instructions produced
by compiling a program for the operating system and archi-
tecture of the attacked system or it may contain addresses of
instructions on the system the attacker wishes to execute. In
the latter case the attack is referred to as a return-into-libc
style attack.
The stack overflow is the simplest code injection vector.
The attacker’s code is injected into a buffer on the stack and
the return address of the vulnerable function is overwritten
to execute the attack’s payload. The difficulty in performing
an attack of this type is to identify the new address to over-
write the vulnerable function’s return address with. There
are two solutions to this problem:
• A NOP sledge may be employed to increase the ad-
dress space of the entry point of the executable code.
• The exact location of an instruction that returns execu-
tion to the injected code must be used.
In the Windows environment, the latter of the two solutions
is the favoured approach since it minimises the size of the
injected code and therefore also the required buffer space.
This approach does however require that the exact address
of the needed instruction be known, which is in the case of
Linux not reliably determined, due to the following. Linux
systems come in many flavours. There are different dis-
tributions and versions of software and libraries used and
they have been compiled using different compilers and dif-
ferent versions of compilers. Resultantly, it is nearly im-
possible to exactly determine both what the absolute layout
of the binary image of a process loaded in memory is, and
where the individual instructions are absolutely located, in a
widely applicable way. The NOP sledge approach is there-
fore favoured in most UNIX environments. By supplying a
long sequence of operations that logically perform no oper-
ations before the payload and an equally long sequence of
return addresses after the payload, it is sufficient to guess
the return address with a few hundred bytes accuracy.
The Windows environment is different because it has
been distributed in binary files. The version of the software
may be determined and it has been compiled using the same
compiler for each distribution. The locations where individ-
ual DLL files are held in memory are largely deterministic,
making use of a NOP sledge unnecessary. The return ad-
dress of the vulnerable function may be overwritten with
an address of an instruction in a DLL file that returns to a
register pointing to the injected code on the stack.
Once the instruction pointer has been seized, execution
is transferred to the payload of the exploit. The following
section describes how the API design differences between
UNIX and Windows effects the construction of these pay-
loads.
3.2. Attack Payload Construction
The classic architecture of operating system kernel and
protected user space processes is shared by both the Win-
dows NT family and UNIX. Processes running in user space
are protected from modifying each other and modifying the
kernel by allocating separate and protected memory parti-
tions, and by providing a single strictly policed interface
to kernel services, which in the UNIX world is generally
called the system call interface, and the Windows world the
Native API.
Calling from user space code to kernel space is achieved
by CPU specific techniques coded in assembly language,
and as such, a library is usually provided which contains
C language proxy functions to the system calls. In the
UNIX programming environment these system call func-
tions are usually provided as a subset of the C Standard Li-
brary (libc). In the Windows environment the Native API
(often called NTAPI) is provided by the NTDLL.dll library.
When we consider the relationship between the APIs
which most system applications are written in with the sys-
tem call interface APIs on both platforms, we see a marked
divergence. On the UNIX platform, the system call inter-
face is generally well documented and readily available via
the standard C library API. The windows system call in-
terface, the Native API, is however poorly documented and
hidden from the average programmer beneath a number of
higher level APIs, such as WIN32, POSIX and OS/2. It is
the first of these API’s which has been promoted most by
Microsoft, and has consequently become the most widely
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adopted API by developers on the Windows platform.
This has led to marked differences in the way that ex-
ploits are written between the UNIX and WIN32 platforms.
While UNIX exploit writers have on a whole used the sys-
tem calls directly to their advantage, Windows exploit writ-
ers have to date avoided writing exploits directly to the
NTDLL system call interface, and instead used a number
of techniques for calling higher level API library code to
achieve their goals. For example, the Slammer worm uses
theGetTickCount function from the kernel32.dll library, and
the functions socket and sendto from the winsock Windows
sockets library directly.
The following section examines different strategies for
how the execution of processes may be monitored in Win-
dows. Tracing code execution is the foundation of our ap-
proach to detecting code injection attacks from the network.
4. Windows Process Tracing
In earlier work [2] we have demonstrated that sandbox-
ing and executing potentially malicious code in a monitored
environment may provide excellent accuracy and complete-
ness properties for intrusion detection. The prototype im-
plementation for the Linux operating environment provided
complete coverage where all code injection attacks includ-
ing attacks using polymorphic payloads were detected and
no false positives have been recorded. This section exam-
ines how a similar system may be implemented for the Win-
dows operating environment by examining how processes
may be traced in Windows.
When we consider tracing the program execution of a
particular piece of code, and more specifically, code which
may potentially be an exploit, it is important to consider
the environment that the code will be executing in. The
principle characteristics of the environment that are relevant
to our discussion are: whether the exploit code runs from
user process space or kernel space; what the contents of the
stack are; what the contents of the heap are; and which code
libraries are loaded.
In our previous work [2], we took the approach of tracing
the system call API on a Linux system by using the ptrace
facilities of the operating system. This enabled us to cap-
ture a trace of what system calls were made by the code
in question. Applying this approach makes it straightfor-
ward to determine the operation of a piece of code and the
basic operation of potentially malicious injected executable
instructions.
In contrast to this approach, most attempts at tracing
APIs on windows have grown out of developers’ desires to
“hook” specific API calls, for reasons such as implement-
ing on-demand virus scanning and adding functionality to
closed source binary code. Due to the poorly documented
NTAPI, these efforts have concentrated on tracing calls at
the more widely understood WIN32 API level, and have re-
quired the combination of code injection and hooking tech-
niques.
Code injection in the context of execution tracing refers
to both the means of getting executable code into the ad-
dress space of the subject program, and the means of en-
suring the tracing functionality is executed to produce the
tracing functionality. One of the simplest ways of tracing is
through the Proxy DLL technique. This involves generat-
ing a DLL which contains on a one to one basis all of the
functions, symbols and resources exported by the real API
implementation library in question. The implementation of
these functions performs a logging operation, then redirects
(or proxies) the call to the real implementation. A proxy
DLL is introduced into a program as the real library by nam-
ing the proxy DLL the same as the DLL in question. By na-
ture of the dynamic linker of Windows, DLL’s are searched
for first in the directory of the main executable of the pro-
gram, then by the system path, so the proxy DLL will be
loaded instead of the real implementation. This technique
combines elements of code injection and hooking and is il-
lustrated the user space region of Figure 1 where the proxy
DLL functions are represented by a grey box.
Figure 1. Detours vs strace tracing method
Other more advanced injection techniques include using
the AppInit_DLLs Registry, the SystemWide Hook SetWin-
dowsHookEx, and Thread Injection techniques. However
these more advanced techniques also require active modifi-
cation (or patching) of the API calls through the use of Im-
port Address Table (IAT) patching or API implementation
patching. A good overview of these techniques is contained
in [8]. We use the Detours injection and hooking library
provided by Microsoft Research as the basis of our API spy
utility. The Detours library implements a number of strate-
gies mentioned above for providing injection and hooking
services to applications.
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In more recent times, the NTAPI has begun to receive
more attention from security researchers, due to contribu-
tions from the likes of Russinovich [10] and Schreiber [11].
Similar to the ptrace technique on Linux for tracing system
calls, a simple form of tracing of system calls on Windows
has been identified and has recently culminated in the re-
lease of strace for NT, which is named after the Linux sys-
tem call trace program with the same name. strace operates
by patching the function pointers in the system call table in
the OS kernel to point to functions that log the system call
and then in turn calls the real system call. The approach
is illustrated the kernel space region of Figure 1 where the
functions inserted by strace are represented by grey boxes.
Very little work in the area of low level system moni-
toring for intrusion detection in the Windows environment
has been presented by the research community. One exist-
ing system is the Windows Host Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tem (WHIPS) [4]. Their approach is based on monitoring
security critical system calls and applying access control
mechanisms by checking their parameters using a reference
monitor at call time. The system calls that are monitored
are: NtCreateFile, NtDeleteFile, NtClose, NtOpenProcess,
NtLoadDriver, NtUnloadDriver and NtOpenFile. The pa-
rameters to the individual system calls are paramount to the
functionality of this system. Our approach only relies on
the existence of operating system resource usage in a sec-
tion of code and therefore we examine the extended subset
of system calls provided by strace.
The following section presents our detection framework
for networks containing both Windows and UNIX hosts.
5. A Generic Detection Framework
The framework for detecting code injection attacks con-
sists of an executable instruction detector residing on an
IDS and a series of sandbox execution environments match-
ing the monitored application environments provided by the
operating systems in the network. Once the IDS has iden-
tified a series of executable instructions in network traffic it
relays the suspicious packet’s payload to an execution envi-
ronment matching the packet’s destination. The appropriate
execution environment is identified by examining the des-
tination IP address of the incoming packet. The payload
is executed in the corresponding monitored environment
and a report containing the payload’s OS resource usage is
returned to the IDS. The IDS generates appropriate alerts
upon receiving the report from the execution environments
if the report contains evidence of resource usage. Otherwise
the packet is considered non-malicious.
Detecting code injection attacks by using a sandbox re-
quires three steps [2]. First the exact entry point or the
first executable instruction of the code must be identified.
Including a byte that is not part of the injected code or
omitting instructions at the beginning of the code may re-
sult in invalid machine instructions and execution failure.
Secondly, if the code has been protocol encoded, the proto-
col data must be removed from the executable instructions
to obtain the original code or execution will fail. Again,
bytes that are inserted into the payload may represent il-
legal machine instructions at execution time and lead to
execution failure. Finally the code must be executed in a
monitored environment to gather evidence of operating sys-
tem resource usage. The first two steps, the executable in-
struction identification and the protocol decoding are, in our
framework, carried out by the IDS. The packet payload is
then relayed to the execution environment where the third
step, the execution monitoring, is performed.
The research presented in this paper relies on the exis-
tence of an efficient method of identifying executable in-
structions in a network stream and does not further examine
approaches to solve this problem. In our implementation
we utilise the Snort IDS together with the NOP detector
Fnord to identify potential executable code. Fnord is a Snort
pre-processor that programmatically detects NOP sledges
by counting instructions that logically perform no opera-
tions that impacts the executing code. We set the threshold
low so that if fnord detects four consecutive NOP instruc-
tions the packet is considered to require further analysis.
We recognise that this approach is not capable of detecting
all Windows attacks that return into DLL files and that does
not include any NOP instructions but demonstrate that the
approach is capable of detecting a number of Windows code
injection attacks. Upon detection of a sequence of NOP in-
structions the IDS carries out a number of steps. First the
appropriate execution environment is selected based on the
destination IP address of the packet. Secondly the appropri-
ate protocol decoding is applied to the payload based on the
destination port number of the packet and finally the entire
packet payload is sent to our analyser starting from the first
instruction identified as being part of the executable code.
Correct configuration of the execution environments is
important to provide accurate detection results. Both the
architecture and the operating system of the execution envi-
ronment must match that of the destination of the incoming
payload. The reason for this is that machine instructions
compiled for SPARC for example are different to instruc-
tions compiled for the i386 architecture, and if executed on
a different architecture than it was compiled for will only
represent illegal instructions. The operating system of the
execution environment must also match because resource
usage may be implemented differently from operating sys-
tem to operating system.
Configuration of the Windows environment is more crit-
ical than that of the UNIX environment if a full trace of
the injected code is to be obtained. The reason for this is
that the injected code utilises user space APIs that may dif-
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fer from release to release. Since the UNIX system call
API is available directly to the user it is pretty much cast
in stone. If it is changed all applications must be rewritten.
The Windows operating system has been designed to only
export the higher level APIs. This leaves the creators free to
change any implementation as long as the higher level APIs
provide the services provided at the previous release. Cer-
tain systems may also have DLL files that are missing on
other systems. Due to these issues the execution environ-
ment must match that of the protected host as close as pos-
sible. Especially, the DLL files provided on the protected
system must also reside on the monitoring environment.
The following section examines how the detection sys-
tem is implemented to capture traffic on the network, anal-
yse the payload of the packet to determine whether or not it
may contain executable code, execute and monitor the ex-
ecution to detect potentially executable code in a Windows
environment.
6. Windows Monitoring Environment Imple-
mentation
The analyser resides on the Windows test environment
and is located on a host separate from the IDS. Its func-
tion is to execute the potentially executable code, monitor
its execution and generate a log that the IDS can evaluate
to determine whether or not the packet contains executable
instructions.
Our implementation of the Windows execution environ-
ment is implemented using the VMware GSX Server and
Windows 2000 Professional is installed as a virtual ma-
chine. VMware provides features that are desirable for this
application. A snapshot feature is provided which enables
us to create a backup of the system when it is known to be
in a safe state. The safe state may then be restored at an
arbitrary point in time. VMware can be configured to revert
to the snapshot instead of shutting down. The GSX version
also has a perl API that makes it possible to build applica-
tions capable of reverting the state of the virtual machine.
Using this feature we are firstly guaranteed that the system
is restored to the known safe state if some malicious code
attempts to shut the environment down. Secondly the IDS
is able to restore the known safe state of the execution envi-
ronment at any given time.
Ideally the known safe state should be restored after ev-
ery single execution. This operation however does incur
substantial overhead, so unless the system is implemented
with a cluster of identical execution environments, service
would be lost for a few seconds. We therefore create a sep-
arate user on the Windows execution environment with re-
stricted privileges that executes the potentially executable
instructions received from the IDS. The restricted user pro-
vides added protection from malicious code due to its lim-
ited privileges. A restricted user may use the operating en-
vironment and save files but does not have sufficient privi-
leges to install software or make changes to system files or
settings or add new users to the system. Despite the fact
that processes in the execution environment are running as
unprivileged processes, we are dealing with untrusted code
and measures must be taken to recover from unforeseen
events. Should some malicious code shut down the sys-
tem, VMware will revert it to the known state. This will
cause loss of service from the execution environment for a
few seconds. The IDS should also return the execution en-
vironment to the known safe state with regular intervals to
compensate for potential Trojans on the system. The time
spent returning the environment to the initial state is rela-
tively short, but to provide the service at all times a sec-
ondary system is needed to fall back on during these time
intervals.
A network server is running in the test environment lis-
tening on a port known to the IDS. The server accepts con-
nections from the IDS once some potentially executable in-
structions have been identified and the IDS transmits the
potentially executable instructions to the server. The server
creates a process containing the potentially executable in-
structions and executes it. The execution is monitored using
the monitoring approaches identified in Section 4.
Tracing at the NTAPI level initially promised to be a
compelling technique, promising both a simple implemen-
tation of API hook functions and the isolation of trace im-
plementation away from exploit code. Since the tracing is
implemented in the kernel, there would be no way for the
code to introspect that it was being traced. However, in
practise, we observed that there was no readily observable
way to relate the NTAPI logs to higher level goals such as
TCP bind, listen, accept, etc. Furthermore, strace requires
the loading of drivers to modify the system call table. This
operation complicates the implementation of the execution
environment if the potentially executable code is to be ex-
ecuted with the privileges of a restricted user, as this user
does not have sufficient privileges to perform this task.
The entries in Table 1 compare log entries generated by
Detours and strace. strace provides a much more granu-
lar trace of the payload execution. The trace using this
method only includes calls to the operating system, and
provides no tracing of user space function calling. The
log entries contained in Table 1 represent a trace of the
ws2_32.WSASocketA call used to create a socket. This API
call in turn calls LoadLibraryExW to load msafd.dll.
Although the trace produced by strace is much more
granular than that produced by Detours, it does not provide
us with any more detail useful for analysis. The information
provided by Detours is easier to analyse because the log en-
tries represent the more widely known programming API
provided by Windows. Under certain circumstances strace
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NtFsControlFile (24,0,0x0,0x0,0x90028,0x0,0,0, ... {status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtQueryAttributesFile ({24,0,0x40,0,0,"\??\C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll"},1240756,..)==0x0
NtFsControlFile (24,0,0x0,0x0,0x90028,0x0,0,0,...{status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtFsControlFile (24,0,0x0,0x0,0x90028,0x0,0,0,...{status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtOpenFile (0x100020,{24,0,0x40,0,0,"\??\C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll"},5,96,...80, {status=0x0,
info=1}, ) == 0x0
NtCreateSection (0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 16, 134217728, 80, ... 84, ) == 0x0
NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
NtMapViewOfSection (84, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, 0x0, 0, 1, 0, 16, ... (0x450000), 0x0, 57344, ) == 0x0
NtClose (84, ... ) == 0x0
NtUnmapViewOfSection (-1, 0x450000, ... ) == 0x0
NtFsControlFile (24, 0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x90028, 0x0, 0, 0, ... {status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll"}, 1241316, ... ) == 0x0
NtFsControlFile (24, 0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x90028, 0x0, 0, 0, ... {status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtFsControlFile (24, 0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x90028, 0x0, 0, 0, ... {status=0x0, info=0}, 0x0, ) == 0x0
NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\??\C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll"}, 5, 96, ... 84,
{status=0x0, info=1}, ) == 0x0
NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0x0, 16, 16777216, 84, ... 80, ) == 0x0
NtClose (84, ... ) == 0x0
NtMapViewOfSection (80, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, 0x0, 0, 1, 0, 4, ... (0x74fd0000), 0x0, 69632, ) == 0x0
NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 20, 0x40, 0, 0, "USER32.DLL"}, ... 80, ) == 0x0
NtMapViewOfSection (80, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, 0x0, 0, 1, 0, 4, ... (0x77e10000), 0x0, 413696, ) == 0x0
NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 20, 0x40, 0, 0, "GDI32.DLL"}, ... 80, ) == 0x0
NtMapViewOfSection (80, -1, (0x0), 0, 0, 0x0, 0, 1, 0, 4, ... (0x77f40000), 0x0, 245760, ) == 0x0
NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
may miss events completely. During monitoring tests using
known exploits, strace did not generate any log entries for
the execution of bind, listen or accept. The only instance
strace can provide information Detours is incapable of is a
attack where the whole shellcode is coded to use the Na-
tive API as recently demonstrated by Bania [3]. Encoding
all the instructions needed to accomplish something useful
using this API would require a larger input buffer and due
to space limitations when exploiting a vulnerable process
this method has to date not been favoured. Furthermore,
writing shellcode using the native API limits exploit com-
patibility between versions of Windows. Therefore, due
to the difficulty in analysing execution traces generated by
strace and the fact that certain events valuable for analysis
are completely missed, execution tracing using Detours is
the favoured approach for our prototype system.
The process executing the potentially executable instruc-
tions may be terminated in two ways. Firstly the execution
may finish normally. In this case all the instructions have
been processed and the complete trace of the execution has
been captured by the execution monitor. Some processes
however will never finish and a second approach to termi-
nate execution is required. An example of code that will
never finish is code that starts a server listening for incom-
ing connections. The execution will in this circumstance
hang on the accept function call. We therefore terminate all
monitored processes after the execution time exceeds a set
threshold of five seconds. In this case the captured log may
only contain parts of the instructions contained in an incom-
ing packet but provides sufficient information for analysing
the operations of the attack.
Once the execution is finished, the log is relayed back to
the IDS. The IDS analyses the log searching for evidence of
calls to DLL functions. A single function call is sufficient
to determine that the incoming packet contained shellcode
formatted executable instructions, and an alert is in this case
generated. The following section contains test results gath-
ered using the Windows execution environment to detect
code injection attacks.
7. Test Results
We have tested our detector on a variety of exploits tar-
geting Windows hosts. The NOP detection method that we
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employ is better suited for the UNIX environment due to the
possibility of using return-into-DLL style attack patterns to
gain control of the instruction pointer in the Windows en-
vironment as discussed in Section 3.1. Therefore, although
our system is highly accurate in its detection and generates
few false positives, the completeness property of the system
will never be better than its capability of detecting potential
executable code in the network traffic stream. The approach
will benefit from a more accurate algorithm for detecting
potential executable code in network traffic than the NOP
detection algorithm provides and once such an algorithm is
identified the completeness property of the system will be
further improved. Despite this fact our approach is capable
of detecting a number of attacks. Examples of attacks de-
tected are buffer overflow exploits against the RPCSS ser-
vice (MS03-039), Microsoft FrontPage Server extensions
(MS03-051) and WINS (MS04-045). We now examine the
exploit against Microsoft FrontPage Server extensions with
regards to its operation and detection.
The exploit targeting Microsoft FrontPage Server exten-
sions overflows a buffer in fp30reg.dll with executable code
that binds a shell on port 9999 on the vulnerable host. The
attacker is then able to log in by using telnet, browse the
file system and perform actions identical to a user having
a cmd shell locally on the host. Parts of the machine in-
structions for the exploit are contained in Table 2. The first
part of the exploit contains a decoding function which de-
codes the payload of the attack. This function serves two
purposes. Firstly it ensures that the payload does not con-
tain any terminating characters (NULL characters) when the
attack is transmitted across the network. Secondly it ob-
fuscates the payload of the attack and complicates pattern
matching IDSes and IDSes utilising the abstract execution
approach. The decoding function has been bolded in Ta-
ble 2. The bolded decoding function XORs the rest of the
payload with a key, in this case 88h, to obtain the clear text
payload. The assembly instructions are contained in Table
3.
Because our approach is based on executing malicious
code in a sandbox, payload obfuscation techniques are
rendered useless as an IDS avoidance measure. Once
the decoding function has completed the attack pay-
load is ready to be executed. First the base address
of kernel32.dll is located. Then a call table is con-
structed and the address of kernel32.LoadLibraryA and
ws2_32.dll is identified. The address of ws2_32.dll
is used to initialise the WinSock API. Once this has
been completed the rest of the call table is populated
with addresses of functions used later during execution.
These functions include kernel32.WaitForSingleObject,
kernel32.CreateProcessA, kernel32.ExitThread,
ws2_32.WSAStartup, ws2_32.WSASocketA, ws2_32.bind,
ws2_32.listen, ws2_32.accept and ws2_32.closesocket.
ws2_32.WSAStartup is called to initialise the WinSock API
and then a socket is created using ws2_32.WSASocketA.
Bind, listen and accept is called to bind the socket to
port 9999, listen for incoming connections and accept
connections from the attacker at a later stage.
The DLL hooking method implemented using Detours
[7] logs resource usage by identifying calls to DLL func-
tions. Table 4 contains some of the library calls the attack
executes during runtime. The library trace starts with the
ws2_32.WSASocketA call to create the socket and ends with
the ws2_32.accept call when the process is in the state wait-
ing for the attacker to connect to the host.
The log positively identifies the attack and provides suf-
ficient information to identify the operations of the attack.
DLL files loaded during execution are identified as well as a
socket creation and subsequent calls to bind, listen and ac-
cept. The execution trace ends with the call to accept which
indicates that the process is in a state waiting for incoming
connections. This is sufficient to determine that the exploit
attempts to start a server. Table 5 contains a list of the ex-
ploits we have tested together with the vulnerability they
exploit and information whether the attack was detected or
not. For attacks that could not be detected, detection failed
because we could not identify the first executable instruc-
tion accurately. In these cases the first instruction of the
exploit code was inserted directly into the analyser to gen-
erate the function call log. By analysing the logs generated,
the first exploit adds an administrator user to the vulner-
able host, exploits 2, 3 and 4 spawn a listening shell on
ports 5555, 9999 and 101 respectively, and exploit 5 and
6 attempt to connect to an outside host to download more
executable code.
The shellcode sandboxing approach has proven to have
excellent accuracy and completeness properties when im-
plemented correctly. During testing for the Linux operat-
ing environment all attacks tested were detected as well as
all code injection attacks contained in the DARPA intrusion
detection evaluation dataset without any false positives [2].
False positives are unlikely events when this approach is ap-
plied due to the difference in appearance of shellcode and
normal binary executables. Shellcode has higher density of
calls and due to its size long jumps never occur except for
calls directly to DLL functions. We have however tested the
detector on 3GB of Windows binary file transmission using
the NOP executable instruction detection approach without
recording any false positives.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a framework for detecting code in-
jection attacks in a heterogeneous environment. The frame-
work is able to detect new or previously unseen attacks
regardless of obfuscation techniques applied. The ap-
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Table 3. Decoding routine
Memory Address Machine Instruction Assembly Comment
00421A41 66 B9 C9 01 MOV CX, 1C9 Length of payload
00421A45 80 30 88 XOR BYTE PTR DS: [EAX], 88 Key is 88H
00421A48 40 INC EAX
00421A49 E2 FA LOOPD SHORT 00421A45
proach consists of an IDS that identifies potentially exe-
cutable instructions and sends the payload of the packet to a
monitored execution environment to determine whether the
packet indeed contains executable code. The appropriate
execution environment is selected based on the IP address
of the incoming packet.
The execution environment for Windows code is also
presented in this paper. We have compared two tracing ap-
proaches and determined that the DLL hooking approach
currently performs better than that of the Native API moni-
toring approach. However, since attacks using only the na-
tive API may be missed, future work includes further ex-
amination of methods to perform system call monitoring in
the Windows environment. The prototype implementation
of the system is capable of detecting Windows code injec-
tion attacks as long as the IDS is able to identify executable
instructions in a packet. Although the accuracy of the sys-
tem is very good, the completeness property will never be
better than the ability of the IDS to identify executable in-
structions. The NOP detection approach, although having
moderate success during testing, does not identify all code
injection attacks targeting Windows hosts. Future work in-
cludes identifying a more efficient algorithm to detect po-
tentially executable instructions in a network stream so that
the completeness property of the system can be further in-
creased.
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Table 5. Exploit table
Vulnerability Exploit Source Detected
MS03-039 /ExploitTree/system/microsoft/remote/MS03-039-exp.c www.securityforest.com Yes
MS03-049 /ExploitTree/system/microsoft/remote/MS03-049ex.c www.securityforest.com No
MS03-051 /ExploitTree/application/webserver/iis/fp30reg.c www.securityforest.com Yes
MS04-011 /ExploitTree/system/microsoft/remote/ms04011lsass.c www.securityforest.com No
MS04-011 Sasser.B NA Yes
MS04-045 WINS Remote Heap Overflow Exploit www.hat-squad.com Yes
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